

NLNP NSC Files HAK Office Files U.S. - Domestic - Agency Files Box 148
State/WH Relationship Vol. 1 January 28-October 31, 1969

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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~~SENSITIVE-EYES ONLY~~

Monday - October 27, 1969

FOR: Al Haig
FROM: Roger Morris *Rgm*
SUBJECT: Cases of Uncoordination

The following may be useful in giving you more precision with regard to your request this morning. I have also added a third problem -- Newsom's penchant for putting the President on the spot with unfriendly members of Congress, including some formal testimony which completely ignored instructions given when the testimony was cleared by the Bureau of the Budget.

1. Instructions to AF Not to Talk to Me

You will remember that this followed the incident at San Clemente in August, in which (a) Tony telephoned a Presidential decision on Nigeria (which went against State) while I was in Newsom's office, (b) Newsom got the word to Okun before I got hold of Ted Elliot, and (c) the Secretary was disturbed that he was "informed" of the White House decision by one of his Assistant Secretaries. The prompt result was that Newsom was summoned by the Secretary and told that AF should strictly limit consultation with the NSC Staff, and on no account discuss "policy moves or decisions" which State was making or planning to make. Newsom then called me to his office to tell me of this order. He said the Bureau would like to continue to have the "benefit" of my views, but they were not at liberty to tell me how they would use this or what they were going to recommend on a given policy problem. Newsom said he was getting out an instruction to his Bureau (which several officers later confirmed) forbidding the transmission of any informal memoranda, conversations on State policy positions, etc. with me. All communications on policy, he said, would come through the Seventh Floor.

All this has made my job somewhat less easy, but scarcely impossible. We still get some cables to clear, still have the IG mechanism, and I do flush out Newsom from time to time despite his guarded tones. *The* Most unfortunate ~~result~~ result, from my point of view, is that officers in the Bureau under Newsom are typically and understandably running scared about contacts with me. And some very good, honest relationships built up

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E.O. 12958, as amended
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carefully over the past few months have been put in the deep freeze by some FSOs who have been told, in effect, that I am beyond the pale.

2. NSSM Paper on Southern Africa

You will recall here again that this was a case of introducing a new option in the NSC paper at the RG meeting, with neither prior circulationⁿ or even notice. Suffice it to say that this simply would not have happened under Joe Palmer, who had major differences with me on policy issues, but was scrupulously above board (as I was with him). As you well know, this new option was a combination of (a) a long-standing effort to wreck the Review Group, (b) AF's lack of intellectual courage in presenting their own position as directly as the IG had agreed in the original NSSM paper, and (c) an effort by Newsom to cut me out by getting an endorsement at the table from HAK.

3. Newsom's Public Statements

Attached are memcons and a copy of Newsom's recent testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa. They tell our "friend", Congressman Diggs, the following:

- State recommended the closing of the Salisbury Consulate (read "we're on your side, Mr. Congressman"). The decision now rests with the White House (read "if it stays open you'll know who to blame").
- State thinks importing Rhodesian chrome would be (a) against the law, and (b) a violation of our international obligations to the UN (read again, "we're OK"). But the decision is still pending (read again, "if the chrome comes in, you'll know who violated domestic and international law").
- US policy is to (a) seek majority rule of Rhodeisa, (b) tighten up sanctions, and (c) formally regard Rhodesia as a threat to the peace.
- The Department of State "points out broader foreign policy aspects" of Southern Africa, but they also have to deal with "representatives of the NSC Staff" (read "which explains why some things go wrong").

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All these instances, documented in the attached, seem to me rather bald violations of the security of the decision-making process. It is none of Diggs' business where a controversial decision rests in the US Government. It is not Newsom's place, in the midst of a policy review in which the President must have free choice, to "explain" to the opposition in Congress the position of the Department of State on the major issues before the bureaucracy. The result of these conversations can only be that, ~~if~~ the President choose a different course from that recommended by State, Diggs and his colleagues will know that their friends in State fought the good fight against the wrong-headed White House. *

I could add to this, of course, (though it is scarcely comparable) that I have been treated to the same medicine for my efforts to get a range of choices in the IG paper on Southern Africa. Some weeks ago, I had lunch with a local academic who asked me, with astonishing accuracy and detail, to explain to him the views I had been voicing at inter-agency meetings. In the same vein, I was told by a highly confidential source that Newsom frequently took my name in vain in briefing Secretary Rogers prior to the RG meeting. The NSC Staff, Newsom apparently told him, "does not share our views" on the basic issue of the ~~national~~ ^{racial} question. I add this last, Al, only for illustration and not at all for attribution, since if the story got back the source could quickly be identified and his career would be in jeopardy.

Attachments

a/s.

* Newsom "cleared" his testimony, as pro forma, with BOB - and was told to avoid all statements implying what our policy is or would be. Commerce and Treas. were told likewise, and they observed the restraint. You can judge from passages at clips how seriously Newsom took the "clearance"